The EU Enlargement Strategy: The Case of Turkey
By María Asensio, Raquel Moya, Miyabi Sato and Paula Valenciano
1. Problem definition and contextualization
Enlargement is considered to be the most powerful instrument that the EU has concerning foreign policy (Smith 2004). Many states have joined the European project. It is in 1959 when, for the first time, Turkey raised the issue of the possible accession of Turkey to the European Union, following the request. In 1999, the European Council recognized Turkey as a candidate country for accession. However, the difficult process of decision-making in this field, which requires unanimity of all Member States, is hampering the accession process. Turkey is nowadays the longest-standing applicant for membership, and only one out of 33 chapters had been closed in the negotiations. The question of Turkish membership is highly divisive among EU member states (Aggestam, 2012).
There are various advantages and disadvantages of the entry of Turkey into the EU:
Its major religion: Muslim population of the EU would increase from 5% to 20% of the total population
Its large population, meaning a big change for the weight of other Member States in the European institutions
Turkey has experienced a decade of growth, which made the country a dynamic and growing economy.
Germany fears an increase in Turkish immigration there.
The occupation that Turkey maintains in the north of the island of Cyprus, with the persistent hostility with Greece.
In addition, Ankara’s refusal to recognize the Armenian genocide of 1915. (Estudios de política…, 2014)
Lastly, the dilemma of whether or not Turkey is European. It is true that part of its territory is in Europe, but most of the country (the Anatolian peninsula) geographically belongs to Asia. However, Europe has never had well-defined borders, and proofs of this are its eastern and western boundaries, which have undergone numerous changes throughout history. Nor can we forget that the Turkish Empire reached Austria and in the 19th and 20th century, Turkey was known as “the sick of Europe”.
Hence, it is considered that the geographical argument to dismiss Turkey was discredited after the accession of Cyprus (Hernández, 2009). In addition, Turkey was a founding member of the Council of Europe, it is part of NATO (Resul, 2014), member of the OSCE and even it may seem irrelevant, it is part of the UEFA and in 2013 turkey participated in Eurovision. Thus, it appears that the attempts to convince that Turkey is not part of Europe do not hold too tightly (Arancón, 2014).
Enlargement is an interesting case of study of EU foreign policy, because it brings us some questions:
Are decision makers guided by normative considerations based on European identity and values? Or do geostrategic calculations and national interests influence them?
How important are individuals, institutions and governments in the process? (Aggestam, 2012)
2. Brief Historical/Chronological Exposition of the Issue at Stake
In 1987, Turkey applied to join the European Economic Community, and in 1997 it was declared eligible to join the EU. Turkey's involvement with European integration dates back to 1959 and includes the Ankara Association Agreement (1963) for the progressive establishment of a Customs Union (ultimately set up in 1995).
Accession negotiations started in 2005, but until Turkey agrees to apply the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement to Cyprus, eight negotiation chapters will not be opened and no chapter will be provisionally closed.
1959: Turkey was one of the first countries to seek close cooperation with the European Economic Community (EEC). This cooperation was developed as an “association agreement” (Ankara Agreement).
12/9/1963: The Ankara agreement was signed. Importance of the establishment of a “Customs Union” so that Turkey could trade goods and agricultural products with EEC countries without restrictions.
1987: Turkey applies for full membership.
13/12/1997: Luxembourg Council Summit declares Turkey eligible to become an EU member
11/12/1999: Helsinki European Council declares Turkey a Candidate Country, following the Commission’s recommendation in its second Regular Report on Turkey.
24/3/2001: the Council adopts the Accession Partnership for Turkey. At the Copenhagen Summit the European Council decides to increase significantly EU financial support through the "pre-accession instrument" (IPA).
16/12/2004: European Council declares that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the criteria for opening accession negotiations in October 2005.
03/10/2005: the “SCREENING PROCESS” begins. The council adopts a negotiating framework and negotiations are formally opened.
01/6/2006: Negotiations are opened and closed on Chapter 25 (science and research), only chapter that has been closed.
11/12/2006: As Turkey refused to apply to Cyprus the Additional protocol to the Ankara agreement, the Council decides that eight chapters will not be opened.
The important issue is the current situation of the negotiations that, since 2006, are completely blocked. 15 chapters have been opened but only one has been closed. In 2014 The EU Presidential candidates promised that Turkey would never join the EU while either of them were presidents. When Juncker won the election he reaffirmed his statement.
The European Commission prepares every year a report that evaluates the progress achieved by every candidate in its membership preparation. The last report, published in 2014, shows that Turkey is making an effort to move on in several chapters of the acquis, but it needs to pay more attention to the enforcement of legislation (European Commission, 2014). This can be more deeply studied in Annex 1.
3. Analytical tools suitable for addressing the case
IR theories are essential to understanding why the actors involved act in one way or another, and how the development of future scenarios may differ. The relations between the EU and Turkey can be seen from several standpoints (Segbers, 2006).
On the one hand, among the EU member states, there is an ambivalence of positions towards Turkey. On the other hand, the importance of European identity and values is very high in this case. We believe that the most important theories to understand the possible Turkish accession are realism and constructivism.
From a realist perspective, states are the key actor in international politics. In this case, realists would assume that states or governments in the Union are the unique powerful actors that can control the process of EU integration and enlargement (Resul, 2014). This would fit in the description of those member states who have clearly sided in favour (UK) or against (France, Cyprus…) the entry of Turkey. Realists mainly pursue their own security and in this sense; many EU countries would prefer to carry on developing their own foreign policy rather than transferring this competence to EU institutions. Proponents of Turkey’s membership defend that Turkey has a big economy and is the second strongest military force within the NATO, which would eventually empower the EU in becoming a global geostrategic player. (The Economist, 2015) They also argue that an escalation of tensions between Turkey and Europe would be harmful. (Solana, 2015)
In our case, since constructivists create their own reality through interpretations, the question is whether the EU members can change their perspective on Turkey. This theory could be useful to explain the cultural and identity dimension, related to the Turkey’s European identity, the disputed cultural differences between Turkey and Europe and similar “cultural barriers” on Turkey’s EU membership (Resul, 2014). Can Turkey’s secularist perspective be enough to be considered one more member state? Where are the limits to the geographical borders between Europe and Asia?
Despite the idea of a “Clash of Civilizations” of S. Huntington, the peaceful coexistence among both civilizations could take place because in many aspects, Turkey is a “modernised” country.
Ideas and perceptions are subject to change and thus, from a constructivist approach, Turkey could be part of the EU as long as the citizens and governments see Turkey as a democratic State who shares the vision of a “single and strong Europe”.
However, there is a fear that Turkey would affect the European identity. If Turkey becomes a member of the EU, Europe would shift from a 5% of Muslim population to a 20%. This European fear called “islamophobia” has been created because of the constant terrorist attacks associated to the Arab world and fundamentalism. If this perception of danger changes, countries will be more open to the entry of Turkey. Furthermore, states such as Greece or Cyprus will carry on to complicate negotiations of accession for Turkey due to the on-going international struggles.
Although it may seem that liberalism is important in this case as both parties are trying to reach an agreement through negotiations, it is considered that what determines the European policies toward the Turkish case is the balance between economic interests within the domestic arena (Resul, 2014).In this case, the European Commission does not have as a big agency as it happened with the Big Bang of 2004; the states are the one who decide, as national interests are blocking the process.
In terms of levels of analysis, the nature of the relations between the EU and Turkey can be appreciated on all four levels (individual, national, systemic and global), although the most important ones are the domestic and systemic factors.
First of all, although the individual level is not very significant, it needs to be mentioned, as the leaders from both the EU member states as well as the President of Turkey, Mr Erdogan, play an important role. However, in the case of state leaders, such as Angela Merkel or Nicolas Sarkozy, they do not tend to think personally, but constrained by their national interest. Nevertheless, Jean Claude Juncker, , has a big agency in the case, being a clear example of the opposition to the adhesion of Turkey on this human dimension (Juncker, 2015). This kind of personal approach makes the process to EU membership more complicated.
The domestic factors are very important, related to national interest, electoral politics, economic and political impact and the public opinion. Turkey is a State rich in culture, traditions and identity. The government is eager to carry out its national interests, and will try to consolidate into a stronger economy with more privileges, even though Turkey’s identity can be affected in some way -probably into a slight westernization. However, nationalism is important in the country and the Turkish citizens may not identify themselves with the European standards. The President, currently Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is now having more power than before. However, the opinion of the Prime Minister also counts; both opinions are needed to take decisions.
Nonetheless, the biggest EU member countries have also adopted different positions in order to pursue their own national interests.
The issue can be seen from a systemic level because the EU, as a supranational institution, trying to ensure a common foreign policy for all member states. This can be appreciated through different treaties, especially through the Lisbon Treaty, whereby member states must promote cooperation, and mutual solidarity. Needless to say, the EU itself is formed by a network of institutions. Besides, the European rules take a big part in the issue. Other systemic factors can be the lack of support from key members, the Commission fatigue and also the current eurocrisis, which is changing the scene completely, Europe is not going to think about another enlargement for about ten years.
Global factors are not as important as national or systemic ones. Global conditions are taken into account because EU state members are sceptic of the entry of Turkey within the EU due to the strong influence of Islam within the country. If the clash of religions is not addressed, this could lead to a proliferation of problems which would need global solutions. Moreover, some EU states fear that the accession of Turkey would endanger the concept of “European project”.
“Either the country will become a consolidated liberal democracy, taking off politically and socially, or it will remain a partial democracy, trapped where it is. A genuine path to European Union membership is the surest path toward democratization.” (Rumelili, 2008) (Cagaptay, 2013)
4. Regulatory norms as ideational resources that the actors may use to support their position
Firstly, it is important to highlight that, according to the Lisbon Treaty, member states have delegated significant functions to the European Commission concerning enlargement. However, foreign affairs and security policy remain essentially intergovernmental. EU foreign policy is still suffering from divisions that make the speaking in one voice difficult (Aggestam, 2012). The case of enlargement is considered an existential policy, which shapes the nature of the European Union. That is why the treaties specify that any state have the power to veto the accession of another country. This means that, in the final decision, every country has the same agency; so if, for instance, Cyprus remains against the accession, although it is a small country, it has the same eventual power than Germany. The unanimity in the European Council is a key point to understand the special difficulties of the process.
The criteria for EU membership have been defined in a number of Treaty texts and declarations:
Treaty of Rome 1957: ‘Any European state may apply to become a member of the Community’ (Article 237)
Copenhagen European Council 1993
The Amsterdam Treaty 1999: ‘Any European state that respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, may apply to become a member of the Union’ (Kochenov, 2004).
Helsinki European Council 1999: Candidate countries must demonstrate ‘good-neighbourliness’ by resolving outstanding border disputes peacefully, if necessary through arbitration by the International Court of Justice. (Aggestam, 2012)
In the process of application, the first step is that the country meets the criteria for accession, which are the essential conditions all candidates must accomplish to become a member state. These criteria were defined at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, so they are called the “Copenhagen criteria”. The European Council aimed to simplify, improve and “depoliticise” the enlargement regulation (Kochenov, 2004) and to ensure that widening and deepening would be pursued in parallel (Aggestam, 2012). Countries who want to become members need to have:
Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. This is called the political criteria.
According to the documents released by the Commission regarding the assessment of this criterium, there are five main arenas of scrutiny: elections, the functioning of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, and anti-corruption measures (Kochenov, 2004).
A functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU. This second criteria is the economic one.
The ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
The rules that the candidate has to adopt, implement and enforce are not negotiable. These rules are divided into 35 different policy fields (chapters), each of which is negotiated separately. There is a vast body of documents regarding the implementation that have been adopted by the Commission, the Council and the European Council (Kochenov, 2004). As these rules cannot be negotiated, candidates only discuss about how and when to adopt and implement them.
Other issues that can be discussed are the financial arrangements (establishing how much the candidate is likely to pay into and receive from the EU budget) and transitional arrangements, when some rules are phased in gradually, to give the new member or existing members time to adapt.
The Commission is the one who decides if a candidate country has met the criteria and when it is ready to accept a new state as a member. Then, the Council must agree upon a negotiating mandate (Europa.eu, 2015). The EU institutions develop an oversight of the candidate’s progress in applying communitarian legislation. Besides, this monitoring process lets the candidate have additional guidance.
As there is a high amount of EU rules each candidate must implement, the negotiations are quite long. Hence, the EU supports the candidates financially, administratively and technically during the process (Europa.eu, 2015).
It is considered that the process is related to the concept of Meritocracy, which refers to the fact that an applicant’s place in the process has corresponded to the progress it has made toward fulfilling the requirements and that all of the candidates are subject to the same requirements and evaluated in a manner based on merit. Thus, the accession process would not work properly if it did not employ objective and technical standards for evaluating whether candidates are qualified to move forward (Resul, 2014). This is also related to the leading role of the Commission that will be explained later.
However, the Copenhagen criteria have been very criticized, as they are so vague and general. The process is still unpredictable and, “despite this apparent ‘depoliticisation’, the accession process nevertheless remains a political one” (Inglis 2000). Besides, the process can imply an element of coercion (Vachudova 2005; Epstein and Sedelmeier 2009), as there can be some interference in the internal affairs of the candidates (Aggestam, 2012).
5. Identification of the key actors and their main pattern of interaction
5.1 Agency of the european institutions
Although it is usually easy to know who the key actors in the enlargement process are, where the Commission has the preeminent role; in this specific case, the Commission is not having the leading role unlike what happened in the Big Bang enlargement, because there are individual statements from EU member states leaders. The states, indirectly, are weakening the power of the Commission. On the other hand, the European council is considered an actor, because it has the agency to move forward the process or to block it. Finally, the European parliament cannot be considered an actor as it only holds a conciliatory position.
Firstly, we’ll introduce the process of application, and, briefly, the role of each institution in the process:
Candidate members submit applications to the Council of Ministers. Then, the Commission evaluates and makes a formal opinion on candidates. A unanimous Council decision is required to start accession negotiations. The first phase of accession negotiations is conducted by the Commission, and involves a detailed scrutiny of the candidates’ ability to apply the acquis communitaire as well as the identification of possible controversial issues. Based on a common position adopted by the Council and the Commission, the Council Presidency conducts bilateral negotiations with the candidates. To endorse the accession treaties, a favourable decision has to be taken by:
The Council by unanimity and
The Commission and the European Parliament by simple majority
Finally, the treaties have to be ratified by applicants and all EU member states (Aggestam, 2012).
1. The European Commission
The Commission is clearly an actor in the enlargement, as it is in charge of monitoring and negotiating the technical aspects of the enlargement. It is a collective actor but it also has a specific figure: Jean-Claude Juncker, who, as we stated before, has declared that he is not going to accept new enlargements while he is in the Presidency. We have to highlight that relations between the EU and Turkey have deteriorated since Turkey became a candidate country for EU membership in 1999. However, the European Commission has been able to manage critical moments and find a solution to them, but, sometimes it has not adopted a positive attitude. In 1999, it proposed that the EU opened negotiations with all the applicant countries except with Turkey, as it prioritized the political criteria and sidestepped Turkey’s membership application, arguing that Turkey did not yet meet the political conditions. (Smith, S., Hadfield, A. and Dunne, T. 2012).
As the EU members hold strong different positions on this issue, governments chose to delegate some power (negotiation and framing) to the European Commission, so that it could exercise a fundamental policy-making role throughout the process (Smith, S., Hadfield, A. and Dunne, T. 2012) The increasing role of the Commission has made the nature of accessions more meritocratic (Aggestam, 2012). This is why the enlargement process has to be considered a matter of combining both intergovernmental and supranational leadership.
The Commission is in charge of evaluating every membership application and decides if candidates satisfactorily fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. Although, as we have already seen that the Copenhagen criteria are vaguely formulated, the European Commission has taken the task of specifying their intentions and, as a consequence, it has produced lot of legislation for the candidates to implement. It has the capacity of exercising pressure on candidates to achieve legal and institutional changes. (Aggestam, 2012). Another important feature to highlight is the annual progress report made by the European Commission to see the evolution of candidates to the EU, as we have mentioned when talking about the chronological evolution of the issue. Although Turkey has made significant progress in different areas by applying recommendations and conclusions formulated by the EU. However, reforms are still needed in order to become a full member of the EU. The last report questions Turkey’s freedom of expression, independence of the Judiciary, military interference in politics, minority rights and relations with the Republic of Cyprus. (ANNEX 2)
Just to sum up the agency of the European Commission in the enlargement process, it is important to know that it exercises both a soft power, and a hard power, when coercively it threatens to “withhold the carrot of future membership” (Aggestam, 2012).
2. EUROPEAN COUNCIL
Although the European Commission has a leading role in the enlargement process, the European Council also participates in it. It is an actor, as this institution can move forward the process or even block it. (ANNEX 3)
However, within the European Council member states hold different positions on whether or not should Turkey become a member of the European Union.
5.2 Position of Member States
There are a variety of positions on Turkey's accession to the EU, no other accession process has led to so many opinions against the enlargement; this is because if Turkey becomes a member, the country would present new and difficult social, economic, cultural and political challenges for the EU.
There is another problem to tackle with when analysing the position of states because, for some states, the actor is the nation itself, as it happens with Cyprus; however, for other states, the actor is the specific leader who presides over the country in a specific moment, as it can happen with France or Germany. This means that, depending on the country, the leader will have a bigger or smaller agency.
The opposition to Turkish membership in the EU has been very strong from the beginning.
France: the leaders are the ones who have the agency, so the position of the state concerning the enlargement has changed with the different Presidents. During the term of President Sarkozy, France was explicitly against Turkey’s accession, alleging it was not a European state. Under the presidency of Hollande, the position has been eased, although France cannot be considered pro-accession yet. The government gave the initial signals to lift its blockade on EU chapters when the French Foreign Minister announced that France would assist Turkey in opening one of the five chapters in February 2013, “Regional Policy,” which had been blocked during Sarkozy’s time (Resul, 2014). Finally, the reason of the position against the enlargement is the French protectionism and fear of arriving for a massive influx of Turkish workers. Besides, French right nationalist groups have spread an anti-Islamic sentiment.
Germany: This case is similar to the French one concerning the agency of the leaders. Under the Social Democratic government, Germany was one of the main supporters of Turkish entry, as it was the main trading partner of Turkey in the EU. However, after the 2005 elections, the Christian Democratic Union has opposed to the Turkish adhesion. Angela Merkel states that relations with Turkey should be only a "privileged partnership”. Again in this case it is a matter of leadership, right now Angela Merkel is wearing “the jacket” of national interest and public opinion.
Although the leaders can be considered actors, their agency is limited, as they have to represent their national interest and the European one.
Cyprus: The state of Cyprus is an actor itself. It does not matter who the leader is, as the problems with Turkey are considered to be of national interest. Cyprus is blocking the case because of the existence of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the refusal of Turkey to recognize the sovereignty of Cyprus. Moreover, the pressure exerted by the EU on the Cyprus issue is the most critical example with regard to the conditions for accessions. Turkey finds itself subjected to Europeans’ pressure to open its ports and airports to Cypriot Sea and air traffic. Eventually, the EU punished Turkey through partially suspending the negotiation process with regard to eight chapters in 2006. (Resul, 2014)
There are also some states and political leaders who find great benefits in the accession of Turkey, support the enlargement and defend the Turkish position in negotiations.
United kingdom: Its position has been constant in its support of the Turkish request. The British government asserts that Turkey's membership would mean a boost to the growth of the European economy and its international weight. However, the government supports the initiative that establishes restrictions on the free movement of persons, in order to mitigate the risk of excessive income of the Turkish population in Europe.
Greece: Its position on this issue has changed substantially. Despite being a fervent opponent for many years, the Greek position turns around because of the influence of the US, and the consequences of the 1999 earthquake. Since then, the support of Greece has been constant despite several frictions on the issue of Cyprus, pointing out that the problems between them will be resolved more easily once Turkey is a member of the EU. However, the Greek popular opinion remains bleak to the admission of Turkey. Again, as it happened in Cyprus, the enlargement is a national issue. Thus, Greece is the actor and not the government, as its president has little agency
5.3 Position of the Turkish society[1]
The Turkey–European Union (EU) relations had lost their momentum and negotiations were going through a period of steady deterioration. The enthusiasm that the Turkish governing elite displayed toward EU membership following the 1999 Helsinki Summit had all but disappeared. Besides, Turkish foreign policy started to focus more on the neighbours in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Lastly, recent public opinion surveys in Turkey repeatedly demonstrated that Turkish people were less enthusiastic about Turkey’s EU membership than previously.
Turkey’s accession process is a good case to demonstrate the changing pull–push balance that in fact has heavily influenced the accession process in a negative way. The slow and difficult process of negotiations has discouraged the population in Turkey, decreasing the percentage of people who consider accession as a positive outcome. According to Euro barometer surveys that percentage dropped from 66% in 2005 to 44% in 2007. This is an outcome that shows that despite meeting all the requirements, at the end of the process Turkey will result rejected. Besides, a survey made by the German Marshall Fund institute in 2010 to 13.000 People has shown that the enthusiasm to be part of the EU has decreased drastically. In that year, only the 38% of the Turkish believed that the accession would be positive.
As it can be seen, there are not many countries pro-accession of Turkey, and the Commission is not in favour either. Every country is making its own calculations, the considerations on the economic and political impact that an eventual accession could have to their country. Other factors are very important, as the important weight that Turkey would have in the institutions and the fatigue of enlargement. The alternative is, as Merkel has proposed, a privileged relation of the UE with Turkey, but not letting the country become a member.
6. Future Scenarios
Currently, there are two important trends going in parallel: the realist and constructivist approach. The importance of national interest and European identity are the main factors in this process. We believe that the most presumable future scenario is that Turkey will not become a member of the European Union.
One the one hand, from the EU perspective, the introduction of new criteria and mechanisms is making the adherence more difficult; any member of the UE can block the negotiation process. Secondly, an “enlargement fatigue” among member states and citizens has emerged. Thirdly, the reluctance of some member states regarding EU enlargement, which shows national interest from a realist perspective, is another obstacle. As we have seen, some influential EU leaders reject the idea of Turkey’s membership and propose instead, “privilege relations” with the country. Moreover, the Euro crisis is an important factor that has made EU members and institutions to forget about the enlargement and focus on the current problems within the Union. Besides, the EU has a limited capacity of absorption and cannot afford the entry of a country with the size and the population of Turkey. In addition, there is more uncertainty due to the possible referendum held in France for future enlargements (Resul, 2014). Lastly, the constructivist approach is important too because Turkey is not considered a European country by everyone, because Muslim-dominated population will probably endanger European identity (Önis, 2013).
On the other hand, from the Turkish perspective, a “euro-fatigue” has also been observed. The Turkish national interest is changing. In fact, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdog ̆an, openly declared that the EU should not keep Turkey busy if it would not let Turkey join the club (Resul, 2014). Secondly, the global economic crisis has not had such an impact in Turkey, what gives the country self-confidence and shows that it needs the European Union less than before (Gardner, 2010)
Another not likely future scenario is that Turkey finally joins the European Union. This new accession will bring significant changes within the EU. Firstly, the cultural impact, the European integration has led to a rise of nationalism and even xenophobia in certain countries, which is related to the constructivist approach. This is why many EU leaders question the compatibility of Muslims and European culture. However, the EU’s goal is to promote a multicultural environment, emphasizing European citizenship and cultural integration. More optimistic views defend the idea that Turkey will bring a moderating position on this cultural tension (The European Union Center at the University of Illinois, 2007). Secondly, the accession would have institutional implications due to its size and large population. Turkey will become the second most populous country within the Union. In the Council, it would have a voting power similar to that of Germany. In the European Parliament Turkey would be assigned about 10% of the seats. In the European Commission the impact of Turkey would be smaller. Turkey may have one Commissioner.
The accession would also lead to internal changes for Turkey, as it would have to normalize relations with Cyprus, to focus on the implementation of the rule of law and fundamental rights and a peaceful settlement with the Kurds would be needed. Concerning the economic impact, Turkey would receive significant transfers within the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy, although its contributions to the EU budget would be relatively small (Lammers, 2006). Turkey would have a leading role concerning energy supply. The country has access to the most energy-rich regions and would have to contribute to their safe transportation into the EU. Moreover, an enormous influx of Turkish people would be expected. Nevertheless, the country would help the EU to manage with ageing population (The European Union Center at the University of Illinois, 2007).
In conclusion, we believe that the problem will remain as stagnant as it is now. We can conclude that the perfect storm is happening nowadays, both if we take a constructivist or a realist approach, we affirm that Turkey will not be a member of the European Union.
7. ANNEXES
ANNEX 1:
The last Progress Report published by the European Commission on Turkish accession can be summed up as follows:
POLITICAL CRITERIA:
There are sharp contrasts:
On the one hand, we find the implementation of reforms adopted in the previous years, particularly the judicial reform packages and the democratisation package presented in September 2013, in which the threshold for budget to support political parties is decreased and the Turkish language is left behind as the conduct of political activity and private education is allowed in other languages rather than Turkish. The adoption in March of an Action Plan on Prevention of Violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was an important step aimed at aligning Turkey’s legal framework and practice with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The Parliament also adopted a law to bring a stronger foundation to the settlement process aiming at a solution for the Kurdish issue. Lastly, in the past September the ministry of EU affairs presented a European Union Strategy intended to reinvigorate Turkey´s accession process based on political reforms, socio-economic transformation and the communication strategy.
On the other hand, it is alleged that the government is corrupted targeting high-level personalities, which raises serious concerns over the independence of judiciary and the rule of law. These developments have also resulted in an increased polarisation within the political spectrum. Several pieces of legislation proposed by the ruling majority, including on fundamental issues for the Turkish democracy, were adopted without proper parliamentary debate or adequate consultation of stakeholders and civil society. Regarding freedom of expression, on the one hand, public debate continued on harsh topics (Kurdish and Armenian Issues). The problem still is freedom of the media, which has been materialized with the bans of Youtube and Twitter. Regarding the fight against organised crime, Turkey improved its programme to counter the financing of terrorism, consolidated the network of witness protection units and reorganised the responsibilities in the fight against the trafficking in human beings. However, large-scale removals of police officers have taken place, which raised concern over their impact on the operational capabilities of key police services involved in the fight against organised crime.
Regarding foreign policy, Turkey has continued to play an essential role with his neighbours, especially in Syria and its opposition against its government. Turkey has also continued to provide practical support to the E3+3 talks with Iran. The regular political dialogue between the EU and Turkey continued, covering both international issues of common interest such as the Middle East and Central Asia, and global issues such as counter-terrorism, foreign fighters and non-proliferation. Turkey has continued its policy of engagement in the Western Balkans, including through its active participation in the South-East European Cooperation Process and its contribution to EU-led military, police and rule of law missions.
However, Turkey continued to issue statements challenging the Republic of Cyprus’ right to exploit hydrocarbon resources in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone for the benefit of all Cypriots. Turkey is expected to actively support the negotiations towards a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded. Despite repeated calls by the Council and the Commission, Turkey has still not fulfilled its obligation to ensure full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and has not removed all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with Cyprus. There was no progress on normalising bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus.
ECONOMIC CRITERIA
Right now Turkey is seen as a functioning market economy that has to face the implementation of structural reforms to be able to find its place in a competitive market as the European Union. The truth is that in 2012, following the recession, output and employment have increased. However, the unemployment rates have risen as a result of a strongly expanding labour force. Fiscal policy should help raising overall national savings in view of the need to reduce the external deficit.
ABILITY TO TAKE ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP (ACQUIS COMMUNITAIRE)
In 2013, another negotiating chapter (22 — Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments) was opened. There has been a good progress on trans-European networks.
Regarding migrations and asylum policies (chapter 24): Turkey has taken great steps despite being attacked by the continuous refugee crisis. Besides, concerning energy, there has been progress, especially on security of supply and the internal markets for electricity, but also on enterprise and industrial policy, statistics on science and research and fight against money-laundering and terrorist financing.
In conclusion, Turkey is making an effort to move on in several chapters of the acquis, for example freedom of movement of goods, company law, industrial policy, trans-European networks or external relations among others.
However, more attention needs to be given to enforcement of legislation, above all in the areas of justice, freedom and security as well as in policy and employment and the respect of fundamental rights, the competition policy to avoid corruption and the information and media for the society.
ANNEX 2:
Here are some examples of changes and reforms carried out by Turkey in order to fulfil the democratic conditions required by the European Union:
The judicial system has become more efficient by including amendments in the Criminal Code. However, reforms are still needed in order to strengthen the impartiality and independence of the judiciary (Chislett, 2006).
Freedom of expression and minority rights: (controversy with the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish conflict). There has been an increase in the number of people prosecuted expressing opposing views to the regime. In this context, the Commission adopted a carrot and stick policy, offering negotiations on 2 chapters dealing with transport networks and consumer protection in exchange of amending article 301 of the Criminal Code. As Olli Rehn, the EU commissioner for enlargement, pointed out: “the prosecution of writers, journalists, academics and other intellectuals for expressing critical views towards the regime cannot be acceptable (Chislett, 2006)”. These actions against freedom of the press and plurality of opinion are incompatible with EU fundamental rights. Due to this situation the Turkish government assured it would submit a bill to the Parliament to improve this situation.
Relations with the Republic of Cyprus: following the Council and the Commission position from previous years, it is crucial that Turkey makes progress in improving bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus (European Commission, 2014). The Commission urged Turkey to open its ports and airports to the Cypriot sea and air traffic. However, the situation did not improve and the EU decided to punish Turkey suspending eight chapters of the negotiation process (Resul, 2014). Moreover, any of these chapters will be closed until Turkey accepts and implements these requirements.
This report shows that Turkey still hasn’t completed its obligations to become a member of the European Union. It also reveals the need of reforms and improvements in specific areas. Candidates to the EU are required to have the capacity of implementing the acquis effectively (Commission, 2014) in order to enter the EU.
ANNEX 3:
In 1992 the Lisbon European Council underlined the importance of Turkey in the European political situation and the desire of strengthening cooperation and relations with this country in consonance with the Association Agreement of 1964. (Müftüler-Baç, 1997).
The European Council, based on the recommendations from the Commission, has the power to decide when to open accessing negotiations. In the case of Turkey accessing negotiations started in 2005. (The European Union Center at the University of Illinois, 2007).
The European Council also decided to provisionally suspend negotiations on eight chapters Due to Turkey’s restrictions to the free movements of goods towards the Republic of Cyprus in 2006 (The European Union Center at the University of Illinois, 2007).
Chapter 1 Free movement of goods
Chapter 3 Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
Chapter 9 Financial services
Chapter 11 Agriculture and rural development
Chapter 13 Fisheries
Chapter 14 Transport policy
Chapter 29 Customs union
Chapter 30 External relations
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[1] From (Crespo, 2010)
